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This paper analyzes labor tax evasion and the impact of labor inspectorate auditing. The analysis is based on 
a unique dataset built by linking two important sources of information: a) a dataset of individual artisan 
firms, b) an individual audit dataset. Our data describe the universe of artisan firms in Piedmont (Italy) in 
2000-2005. Using information on firm characteristics and  tax evasion, observed directly  from the audit 
exercise, we: a) estimate undeclared work in the artisan sector; and b) evaluate the impact of tax inspections 
on employer labor tax declarations. Relying on a double hurdle selection model we find that the artisan 
sector  includes  around  14%  of  undeclared  workers.  We  find  also  that  inspections  could  be 
counterproductive, decreasing tax revenues and not increasing non compliance. 
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1.  Introduction and literature review 
 
    The relation between tax compliance and auditing has been explored in theoretical work in economics 
since the pioneering  work by Allingham, Sandmo (1972). Andreoni et al. (2003) provide an outstanding 
survey  that emphasizes  the different impacts of “commitment”, and “no commitment” audit strategies on 
tax compliance behavior. 
The main difference between these strategies/models is the assumption of commitment by the tax agency. 
Some models (in the contract theory tradition) assume that the tax agency can announce and commit to an 
audit policy, that is known to taxpayers before they file their tax returns. Other models assume that the tax 
agency  cannot commit  to  an  audit policy,  and  makes  decisions  after  receiving  tax returns  about  which  
taxpayers to audit. Both assumptions are reasonable, but yield very different predictions about tax evasion 
and auditing. 
 Another  flourishing  branch  of  the  theoretical  public  finance  literature  looks  at  the  relation  between 
uncertainty, audit enforcement and compliance behaviors (see, among others Snow-Warren (2005,2008); 
Alm (1998, 2006WP). With regard on Snow-Warren they notice that uncertainty on audit effectiveness could 
induce more compliance, and that experience the event of an audit can induce non compliant behavior. 
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However, there are few empirical analyses due to the fact that privacy laws and secrecy policies make it 
difficult  to  disclose  this  information.  The  majority  of  the  empirical  work  in  this  field  is  aimed  at 
understanding the consequence of  an audit for income tax evasion and taxpayer compliance (see Erard 
(1997)‟ Dubin (1998) for examples). 
 If we exclude Alm, Blackwell and McGee (2004), which focuses on Gross Receipts Tax in New Mexico, 
there  are  few  empirical  analyses  of  firm  compliance  choices.  Dabla-Norris,  Koeda  (2008)  and  Gatti, 
Honorati (2008)  use  firm  level  data to  study  the relationship  between  bank  credit  and informality  in  a 
transition country; while Straub (2005) provides a survey of empirical work on bank credit and informality. 
 To our knowledge, there are no studies labor tax evasion/compliance (or undeclared work) developed using 
individual audit data, or on the impacts of audits on labor tax evasion and the effect on firms‟ labor force 
declarations
1. 
There are several examples of statistical economics analyses that try to estimate the size of undeclared work 
or the hidden economy. Schneider and E nste (2000) provide  an very  extensive cross country empirical 
analysis of the size of the hidden economy. They report estimates  for various years, based on four main 
methods: the Currency Demand method (Tanzi (1983)), the Aggregate Electricity Consumption method 
(Johnson et al. (1997)), the Household Electricity Consumption method (Lacko‟ (1999)) and the MIMIC 
(Loayza (1996) and Giles (1999)).  
Our analysis uses individual audit data to estimate the undeclared labor force. 
Our study focuses primarily on labor tax evasion (contributive evasion), or evasion of social security tax. 
Usually this tax is collected by employers, who have the responsibility for saving part of the gross wages for 
their workers. As we explain, the presence of undeclared workers in a firm is strongly related to labor tax 
evasion. In order to avoid payment of social security contributions employers are obliged to under declare 
the real numbers in their labor force, to the social security authorities .  
    This analysis explores a unique dataset based on labor tax inspections which we use to model undeclared 
work. We conduct two empirical analyses to understand the relation between auditing and social security tax 
compliance (and consequently undeclared work). 
 We  explain how we deal with specific econometric problems (i.e. sample selection) related to the data. 
    Our main findings are that inspections could be counterproductive, decreasing tax revenues and increasing 
non compliance. 
    We also discuss some practical and theoretical intuitions to support our empirical evidence. 
Since this study is the first to use individual audit data on social security compliance, we believe that further 
work is needed on this area. Nevertheless, it should make a first contribution to the literature.  
 
 
2.  Our setting  
2.1 Environment 
 
To encourage tax compliance in the Italian social security tax system, the Italian Social Security Institute 
(INPS) conducts audits of firms. The aim of these inspections is to detect evasions and to fine entrepreneurs 
that try to cheat. In our case cheating  means hiding a part of the labor force by non-declaration to the 
appropriate authority
2 thereby avoiding payment of social-insurance tax.  
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    Within this definition are the activities of: 
    1)  Permanent work developed without compliance with social security law 3 
 
INPS is responsible for collecting social security contributions and enforcing payment. Employers in Italy 
are responsible for paying the social insurance taxes for their employee (acting as “sostituto di imposta”). 
They set the amount of taxes to be paid making monthly declarations of the numbers of their employees to 
INPS. This tax in Italy is around 40% of the gross wage
3 and an employer found to be underreporting labor 
numbers is fined to the amount of the underpaid tax plus 33%.   
 We examine the Piedmont artisan sector.  “Artisan” refers to firms registered in the Albo degli artigiani. 
Artisan firms are not regarded as manufacturing firms, which is related to the tradition in the Italian labor 
market. However, it is common to find   services for manufacturing firms,  transport services, personnel 
services and technology (i.e. games and software houses) in this group; which firms can be included as 
artisan is dependent on their size. According to the production sector (to which they belong) artisan firms 
cannot exceed a certain number of employees
4. 
Generally, Italian artisan firms employ less than four  workers, but in the majority case  declare only one 
employee. Artisan firms in most of the Italian region exceed 50% of total firm activity, which applies also to 
the case of Piedmont. 
Undeclared or “black work”, in Italy is a substantial problem. Every year the Italian Statistical Institute 
(ISTAT) estimates the 
5 percentage of Italian undeclared employees to provide an aggregate level of full time 
employed (FTE) irregular workers, per regions, per year for the four main productive sectors (industry, 
constructions, agriculture, services)
6.  For the years taken in  our study 2000-2005, the  percentage of 
undeclared workers estimated by ISTAT is around 17% (of the total amount  FTE in the labor market),  of 
which 27% was in the southern Italian regions (i.e. Calabria). The percentage of non-declared in Piedmont is 
around 5-6%. The ISTAT index is an aggregate indicator that do es not allow descriptions for the artisan 
sector; this applies also to the provincial level. 
 We propose an indicator that takes account of the artisan sector based on our individual audit dataset.      
 
 
2.2 Auditing scheme 
 
As Andreoni et al.(2003) note, there are two ways to build an auditing scheme. Audit authorities can decide 
to publish or not their audit policies. 
Theoretical schemes are difficult to apply in practice. Based on knowledge of the procedures applied by an 
audit authority, it is difficult to ascertain whether an authority subscribes to one or the two schemes. An 
appropriate test would be to construct in order to answer this question carefully. Di Porto‟s (2009) 2009 PhD 
dissertation and Persico, Di Porto, Saughuet (2010 WP), provide for INPS auditing a test that shows INPS 
authority follows the strategy of non-disclosure (no commitment) of their scheme.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
    2)   Occasional work by self employed workers responsible for payment of their own tax , students, housewives or 
retired people 
    3)   Foreign or irregular employees A work developed by a stranger nonresident or irregular 
    4)   Part time work, part of a multiple employment, which is not the main job but, without declaring this situation to 
the appropriate institutions.  
Receiving a wage without paying full social security taxes is tax evasion. The guilt rests on the employee if the 
obligation to pay the social security tax is his (as in  Sweden), but in most countries, it is the employer who is 
responsible of deducting the tax from the gross wage and paying it to the appropriate authority (as in  Italy). 
3 For most workers this tax is 40-42% of the gross wage; for some it is 38%  
as “artisans,” and only 23% for specific types of workers who are not permanently employed. Our data distinguish 
among the first two types of workers. Our declared worker are all “artisan”, since we are exploring the artisan labor 
market in Piedmont. 
4 For an extensive survey on Piedmont artisan firms see Di Porto, Giordanengo, Filippi (2009), )(in Italian).  
5 An explanation of this methodology is provided in “L’occupazione non regolare nelle stime di contabilit￠ 
nazionale”nota metodologica, www.istat.it, cited in OECD (2004) available on line at www.oecd.org    
6 In 2010, ISTAT will publish a more refined index, containing more disaggregated sectors. 4 
 
INPS audit department (vigilanza ispettiva INPS) keep their targets secret. They choose firms to audit based 
on maximizing INPS revenues through the fines imposed
7. Therefore, they select, from the whole universe of 
firms, those most likely to have underreported their workers. 
 We can identify two groups of inspections: a) the authority as a strong clue that an underreport it was made, 
we can call this the “red flag” group audit which happens if the authority receives a declaration directly from 
a private citizen (i.e. a worker that would have back his social security payments). Or when by mistake (or 
on  purpose)  the  employer  declares  the  worker  but  do  not  pay  his  social  security  tax
8  (scopertura 
contributiva). Our data shows when an inspection is conducted following a red flag ; b) the authority decides 
to target a particular group of firms, relying on its socio-economic knowledge of the market, which we call 
“targeted inspections”. Sometimes it is the inspector him or herself that audits the particular firm, in this case 
he or she relies on knowledge of the territory he or she covers. INPS inspectors have certain degree of 
freedom in his choice; it is normal practice for policing authorities to have discretionary power in their 
dealings with their customers. INPS inspectors are regarded by the public as Street level bureaucrats Lipsky 
(1980). Every INPS inspector is assigned to a particular area where he or she develops the audit. Areas are 
usually by province, or municipality if the province is too big (i.e. Rome, Milan, etc).  Our dataset give 
information about this last kind of inspection,  although it does not explain us why a specific firm was 
targeted. 
 We  use a  selection  model  based  on  the firm‟s    observed  characteristics  (location,  dimension,  etc)  and 
characteristics  of  the  audit,  in  order  to  understand  which  firms  are  more  likely  to  be  audited.  This 
information is fundamental for estimating tax evasion /undeclared work in the artisan firm sector.        
 
 
3.  Data 
 
Our  dataset  is  built  by  linking  two  main  sources  of  data:  A)  an  individual  audit  dataset  that  contains 
information on inspection characteristics, information on the firm inspected and information on the result of 
the inspection: amount of fine, number of undeclared workers found, number of days spent on the inspection. 
This dataset contains also: Uff(i), dummies that describe which office in the INPS structures decides to 
develop the audit. The INPS organization is structured as follows. There is a national level, a regional level 
and a territorial level. At any level a decision could be taken to audit a particular firm. Uff1 define the 
national level, Uff2 the regional, Uff3 the territorial agency and Uff4 defines when is another Institution that 
advises INPS to conduct an audit. The dummies Control(i) define the administrative control of the previous 
audit . Those controls describe the different red flag situations or the targeted inspections: Control1 are 
administrative  controls  developed  merging  different  administrative  datasets,  control2  are  targeted 
inspections,  control3  define  those  audit  that  are  developed  after  a  complaint  (a  worker  wants  to  be 
reimbursed for a contribution and calls INPS for an inspection), these have been referred to as whistleblower 
audits. Control4 are inspections after a bankruptcy trial. Control5 are audits developed after a “scopertura 
contributiva”. The dummies Task(i) define the task force that developed the audit: Task1 is where one INPS 
inspectors goes to inspect the firm. Task2 is when the INPS and some other administrative inspectors  are 
involved  (i.e.  health  care  inspector  etc.).  Task3  is  one  when  a  policeman  accompanies  with  the  INPS 
inspector. This dataset refers to inspections in Piedmont artisan firms in the period 2000-2005 .  
B) an individual firm dataset of Piedmont artisan firms, which contains information about all artisan firms 
active  in  the  period  2000-2005,  information  on  employers  (i.e.  sex),  firm  (location,  productive  sector, 
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8 This situation happens frequently for a number of reasons, i.e. the employer relies on a large number of firms 
present in the market and on that forgetting a monthly payment might not be noticed by the authorities (recall that 
payments are due monthly). It can happen also if an employer under declares in one month his already declared labor 
force.   5 
 
number of years of activity, etc.
11), workers (number declared every year, average yearly labor tax to be paid 
by the employer for a  FTE worker, expressed in euro). These two sources are lined by the identification 
numbers that occur  in both datasets
12 and allows us to link the artisan firms in the firm dataset with the 
corresponding inspected firm in the audit database. In other words for those firm s not inspected we  have 
information only from the firm dataset; for audited firms we have information from both datasets. 
 Our dataset contains black economy firms, firms that are not registered as firm but that develop a productive 
activity using undeclared workers
13.  
 We summarize our main information based on simple summary statistics, which are explained in detail in 
Appendix 1 which provides tables of summary statistics. 
 Our dataset consists of a structures panel dataset. Not all firms are active for the whole observation period, 
which means that the panel is not balanced. The panel is composed of a total of 200,965 firms for the 2000-
2005 period. 
Roughly 133,000 firms are active each year, 1,5% of  which have been inspected by INPS. The average 
number of workers declared by these firms is 1, they are very small firms and 90% of the firms active every 
year do not declare more than 4 workers. These dimensions are in line with Italian standards. 
 The average number of undeclared workers found during an inspection is less than 1
14, while the average 
value of tax evasion discovered in an inspection is roughly around 1,100 euro. Just 53% of the selected firms 
are inspected „successfully‟ by which we mean resulting in a fine to the  employer
15. 
 For FTE declared workers in the artisan sector the amount of tax annually is 4000 euro on average
16. Thus,  
on average, in our observational setting, a worker found working in  the black economy has been under 
declared for less than 3 months
17. Using the amount of evasion discovered and the average amount of tax  to 
be paid for a FTE legal worker (both available from our dataset), we can calculate the number of months that 
a worker has worked undeclared. This information can be used to calculate a proxy for irregularity which we 
call FTEBW (FTE black workers), that is the euro value evaded and discovered by the inspector in a specific 
firm, divided by the average amount of tax to be paid in one year for a FTE legal worker. This s a continues 
variable that is 1 if the amount of evasion discovered is equal to the  average amount of labor tax to be paid 
yearly. On average, an artisan firm discovered evading 4 ,000 euro will have FTEBW≈1. This variable is 
created since the information provided by number of workers detected as undeclared during an inspection is 
not  reliable  indicator  for  the  dimension  of  the  evasion.  FTEBW  on  average  is  around  1.1  but  its  75th 
percentile is 0.46; this variable is skewed and mostly 0, table 7 provided detailed stats on this variable. 
 
 
                                                           
11 The productive sectors considered are: Mechanical, light manufactures, other manufactures, Construction, 
Reparation,Transport , Firm services and Personal services. The locations are the Piedmont provinces: 
Alessandria,Asti,Biella,Cuneo,Novara,Torino,V.C.O.,Vercelli. 
12 Provided by INPS Regione Piemonte and Osservatorio delle attività produttive Regione Piemonte 
13 INPS audit dataset contains information on those firms. When one is detected by an inspector the firms is forcibly 
recorded as inspected. Therefore we should find it, firstly, in the individual audit dataset. After the inspection a 
“completely black” firm is then recorded as a firm and, from that period it has to pay labor tax (plus the fines 
imposed). We find these firms recorded also in the second dataset and their activity will start from the year of the 
inspection. Very often those firms do not continue production after being discovered. The cases of massive evasion 
reported in table 4 appendix 1, usually are cases of completely black firm.  
14 This because some inspections do not find irregular workers.  
15 INPS defines successful audits as those audits that reveal every kind of formal irregularity. Formal irregularities are 
also irregularities such as not recording in the firms records the name of a worker, therefore also silly formal issue, 
usually not fined (or fined with a risible forfeit). Conversely, our analysis highlights, only those cases directly related to 
undeclared work. Even including these small formal irregularities the success rate is 65%. 
16 This amount is calculated knowing the average amount of gross salary paid every year per each sector. 
17 As already said, the evasion discovered is proportional to the number of days worked undeclared. This means that 
evasion of 4000 euro correspond to a 1 years completely undeclared work; 1000 corresponds to 3 months.   6 
 
4.  Undeclared work estimation 
 
Measuring tax evasion is very difficult. Tax evasion by nature is concealed, compliance goes hand in hand 
with enforcement, and observed compliance is the result of the strategy of the enforcement agencies  in 
response to the tax-payers‟ behaviors. 
 In  our  case  we  attempt  to  measure  undeclared  work  relying  on  individual  audit  information.  This,  as 
explained in section 2.2, are indeed information provided after a strategic selection.  
INPS selects firms for audit that are likely to have underreported  their real labor force numbers. 
 Selected data produce biased estimates, if the selection is not treated carefully. 
 Relying on what we know about the audit schemes and firm and inspection characteristics, we can attempt 
to  estimate  undeclared  work  in  a appropriate  selection  model.  Our dataset  was  built  with  this  aim  and 
includes characteristics of non audited firms. Thus we can observe the full sample of artisan firms, and the 
sub sample of those believed to be tax evaders, which indicates the results of inspection. 
The  proposed  selection  model  follows  Cragg‟s  (1971)  and  Blundell-Meghir‟s (1987)  modified Tobit  or 
double hurdle model (DH). In our setting an audit follows a precise procedure. 
 The  audit  department  selects  a  sample  of  firms  and  the  real  result  of  the  inspection  (the  number  of 
irregularities detected) fallout from the inspection. Therefore, there are two selections to be treated, one is 
"being  inspected  or  not",  and  the  second  is  "being  irregular  and  how  much"  (given  the  fact  of  being 
inspected). 
 Our variable FTEBW, could be used as a dependent variable in the selection model to estimate undeclared 
work, but is strongly skewed and sometimes zero as shown in table 7. Moreover a linear prediction based on 
this variable could lead to negative predicted values, which are not consistent with our aims; thus we decided 
not to use Heckman selection. We transform FTEBW from continuous to count and we choose to model this 
new variable in a setting that can handle skewness and a great amount of zeros
19.  
 The idea behind the DH formulation is that a probability model governs a binary outcome of whether  a 
count  variables  varies  as a  zero or  positive. If  positive, the "hurdle is crossed", and the conditional 
distribution of the positives is governed by a Tobit or similar data model. 
 The double hurdle setting has a similar log likelihood to a Tobit, as demonstrated by Cragg, but allow us to 
get rid of the negative prediction problem, which is guaranteed by the Tobit (or truncated zero model in the 
second stage). Therefore, we need to compute two stages: one for the binary outcome (inspected or not) and 
one that assumes  that a normal distribution truncated at zero governs the errors of our positive outcomes 
(detected as evaders and fined). With  these assumptions we can complete our model using a T obit (or 
truncated at zero) regression
20. DH can be estimated using count or continuous dependent variables in this 
second stage. This is a perfectly legitimate variation on the limited dependent type model proposed by Tobin 
and it is a slight variation of Cragg (1971). The second step of a double hurdle can be computed in many 
different ways, when we use count variable as dependent,  Poisson regression or zero truncated negative 
binomial are common, this is confirmed by Amemiya (1984). Newman et al. (2008) provide a similar model, 
accounting for a continuous dependent variable in a double hurdle setting. 
 In the usual double hurdle formulation, a Probit determines the decision to participate in a program (or make 
an expenditure), while a Tobit determines the level of variation that has a certain outcome variable given the 
fact  of  being  involved  in  the  program   (or  level  of  expenditure).  In  our  model  we  have  a  “forced 
participation” level, being selected as possible evader and, a second level that quantifies the extent of the 
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evasion. This second level includes only firms identified as probable evaders in the first stage and detected as 
evading a certain amount of tax
21. 
For practical reasons, we implement the model in two stages,  which is a legitimate transformation of the 
original Cragg formulation, and as explained in McDowell (2003), the hurdle model log likelihood can  be 
maximized without loss of information, by maximizing the two components separately. The theory provides 
no guidance about which explanatory variables to include in the first and second stage s of the DH model. 
However, including the same set of covariates in each hurdle makes it difficult to identify the parameters of 
the model and so exclusion restrictions must be imposed (Jones, 1992; Yen et al., 1996). 
 Of course our formulation is not free from limitations, it can be argued, for example, that corruption or 
bribery behaviors may lead to bias. However, we believe that these kinds of practices are not very diffused in 
this part of Italy. Data such as we have here would be more biased if based on regions where criminal 
organizations had great power over the market, which does not seem to apply to Piedmont. 
 We rely on the DH formulation to take account of other types of measurement error.  
The first stage Probit model is developed on the whole sample of firms for 2000-2005. ISP is a dependent 
variable that takes the value 1 when a firm is inspected. The covariates we use in this stage are DEP number 
of declared dependent workers, SEX the employer‟s gender, AGEFIRM number of years of firm activity, the 
3 UFF(i) dummies, the 6 Control(i) dummies (that define red flag or targeted inspections), 8 dummies for the 
productive sectors and 8 dummies for the Piedmont provinces. 
The second stage is developed on the sample of firms evading detected by the audit. The dependent variable 
is disHTE, the covariates are DEP, the dummies for provinces and sectors, the 3 TASK(i) dummies detect 
the effect of different task forces, SEX the employer‟s gender and PERIOD the number of days over which 
the inspection was conducted. Our dependent variable in this second stage is a count variable. It is created 
starting from our indicator of irregularity FTEBW. Firstly we winsorize FTEBW at the 95 percentiles. Then 
we discretize this continuous variable recoding in the following way: from value 0 to 0.25 we create class 0, 
from 0.251 to 0.75 we create class 1, this stands for one half time equivalent (HTE) undeclared worker 
detected, from 0.751 to 1.25 we create class 2, thus two HTE detected (or a FTE undeclared worker). We 
continue in this way creating 11 classes of HTE undeclared workers. In fact the 95 percintile of FTEBW is 
around 5. As we said this second step of DH can be done in many different ways. We choose zero truncated 
negative  binomial estimation  (ZTNB).  Our  purpose is  to treat the large  amount  of  zero that  affect  our 
dependent variable as well as its skewness. For this reason ZTNB or Poisson (zero truncated poisson) are 
good choices in DH model. After an appropriate LR test we prefer to use ZTNB, DH formulation imply to 
test normality of residuals in the two stages, in Appendix 2 we present robustness checks for residuals, LR 
tests and Wald tests for the specification of the model.   
Table 5 shows an extended formulation of the model, usual coefficients and marginal fixed effect for both 
the regressions are presented. 
In the first stage the covariate DEP as a positive effect, therefore probability of being inspected increase with 
firm dimension. Older firms are less likely to be inspected, AGEFIRM coefficient is indeed negative. Older 
firms could be seen as the stronger firms in the artisan market, we could say that employers of those firms 
learned how to stay on the market, usually those firms are less involved with illegal practice (Meldolesi, 
2000). INPS doesn‟t seems to differ really much its choice referring on productive sector, while much more 
clear is the strategy adopted for the different provinces. According just on the information provided to this 
first stage, INPS seems to suspect evasion being concentrated on those firms young and big (big respect to 
the tiny dimension of this artisan sector), no matter which sector they come from. Sex of the employer 
doesn‟t seems to be a clue for the inspector. The other dummies used at this stage are qualities of the 
inspection  developed.  They  are  all  significant,  INPS  leaves  to  its  local  departments  a  good  amount  of 
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discretionary. The dummies for Regional and territorial department are both positive and significant. While 
the great part of the audits derive from whistleblower, targeted and bankruptcy inspections.      
The second stage reveals that bigger firms evade more, age is not significant while sectors dummies explain, 
better than in the previous stage, the extent of the evasion. Respect to the benchmark sector (mechanicals) 
every other sectors seem to evade less. Long inspections reveal much evasion, in fact period is positive and 
significant. Audits developed together with other authorities are more profitable. 
 A better picture could be revealed predicting the average number of undeclared workers in the artisan sector.  
Tables 6 describes the average percentage of full time equivalent black economy workers disaggregated for 
different characteristics. The average value of undeclared work in our sector is around 14%
24. 
 An average of 14% is not in line with ISTAT estimates for this  Region. Thus if ISTAT index is a good 
predictor of the average amount of  under declaration presents in the whole Piedmont market, we have to 
conclude that artisan sector seems to attract the great quantity of hidden economy, as a consequence evasion 
is mostly concentrated in artisan sector. This picture is in line with a great part of the Italian literature on the 
field. Meldolesi (2000), observes that the informal connections that characterize artisan production increase 
the probability of getting to illegal contracts. Artisan sector is composed by a huge amount of little firms and 
this create a perfect humus in order to conceal non compliant behaviors. The same picture is provide by Di 
Porto, Giordanengo, Filippi (2009). The province of Torino, which is the biggest and the more industrialized 
in the Region, has the great percentage of evasion around 17%. Mechanical sector is predict to have the great 
amount of evasion the double if compared with other sectors, more than 10% of the evasion is present in 
manufactures and transportations. It should be noted in the particular case of transportation, this  results was 
expected  since  in  Italy  there  is  a  pervasive  existence  of  “padroncini”  very  small  transport  companies 
(specialized  in  domestic  removals  and  transport)  with  limited  vehicle  fleets,  usually  small  vans.  Take 
advantage of the fact that these vehicles are always on the move, there is no established “head office” and it 
is fairly easy to not declare numbers of drivers and thus evade tax.  
Our prediction is a very refined picture of the labor market, which allows us to detect undeclared work at 
province  level,  ISTAT  index  cannot  provide  this  disaggregated  picture.  To  our  knowledge,  no  other 
estimator has been provided that is capable of detecting evasion in the artisan sector.   
 
 
5.  Evaluation  
5.1 A simple model 
 We now provide an evaluation of the impact of an inspection on firm choices. We are interested in how an 
audit influences the future behavior of the employer. Does behavior change or not? We are interested in 
whether : a) auditing a firm affects future tax declarations by the employer (this argument is clearly related to 
the  number  of  workers  declared  by  the  employer);  b)  auditing  has  an  effect  on  the  numbers  of  black 
economy workers hired by a firm in the future. 
 We rely on our dataset to answer these questions, and therefore asses an empirical evaluation based on 
difference in differences (DiD) analysis. 
 A first theoretical view of our setting is fundamental in order to form expectations on the possible outcome 
of  our  empirical  evaluation.  As  already  mentioned,  we  principally  follow  the  assumption  of  a  no 
commitment audit, in which the audit authority does not make public its strategic choices before conducting 
an audit. 
                                                           
24 Our Double hurdle estimates are based on classes of HTE black workers, from them the passage to FTE is an obvious 
and simple multiplication. Indeed 2 HTE = 1 FTE. Therefore we predicted the number of HTE in every artisan firm 
form the DH model and then we transform them into FTE.    9 
 
 To understand the possible effects on employers‟ compliance we need to investigate a) the probability of 
being audited and/or the probability of being audited several times in a row; b)  the amount of the fine(s) 
imposed; c) the possibility of avoiding total payment of combined fines. 
 On  the  first  point,  issue  Di  Porto,  Giordanengo,  Filippi  (2009)  develop  a  simple  simulation  on  the 
probability of being audited based on the observed audit probability in the period 2000-2005 in the Piedmont 
artisan sector. They observe that if every year  a random 1.5% of firms was inspected (in line with the 
average percentage of inspected firms), among Piedmont artisan firm after 10 years the probability of being 
chosen (randomly) at least once time would be around 15%, which means that 85 % of the firms would not 
be inspected. The same simulation provide an idea of how the situation would change with an enforcement 
of 5% which would mean that after 10 years the probability would be 40% of the firm population. It is clear 
that the probability of being inspected plays a fundamental role in firm choice. 
 In the case of artisan firms, the probability of being chose over time is small
25.It is also  interesting to 
examine the behavior of an employer that has been audited. This was investigated by Snow-Warren (2007), 
who notes that tax evasion is affected by the taxpayer‟s perceptions of the audit probability and is influenced 
by  prior  audit  experience,  showing  that  for  a  variety  of  risk  preferences  (CARA,CRRA  and  DARA)  , 
Bayesian updating increases present and expected future tax evasion and reduces tax payments, inclusive of 
expected fines. Therefore, it could be expected that, as a result of being audited, under declaration increase.  
In the case of artisan firms there are no examples of more than one audit of the same firm in the 5 years 
observed
26 . 
In order to emphasize  points b) and c)  above, we develop a simple model of  a no commitment audit to 
explain the compliance behavior of an employer and the role played by  fines. We would also underline an 
issue  neglected by  the  theoretical models  of  the role played  by the public credit recovery system and 
administrative justice. An interesting argument in the context of the Italian labor market, is the inefficiency 
of the Italian administrative justice. In our case, this inefficiency allows an evader discovered by the INPS to 
be cheating, to pay just a  small proportion of the fine imposed
27,based on evidence from the Italian "Corte 
dei Conti", which estimates the amount of credit recovery from contributive inspections to be less than 23%. 
In the following, we provide an interesting and very simple model of tax compliance,  similar to  that in 
Snow-Warren (2005). We  make some minor  modifications  to  account for  what we call  the  "recovery 
problem" related to the penalty rate: in Snow-Warren the penalty rate θ is equal to the amount of the fine 
evaded plus a certain percentage (i.e. 1000 euro of evasion detected becomes 1300 euro of fine, that is equal 
to a  θ=1,3,therefore θ>1). In our example, we use a recovery rate of r, 0≤r≤1. Therefore the penalty rate 
becomes a "real penalty rate" of Θ=θr . We assume that an employer decides to cheat (or not), based on this 
real value of the penalty rate. We consider an individual taxpayer with a fixed taxable income W,  facing a 
non random, proportional tax rate t, who chooses an amount of undeclared income x to hide from the tax 
authority. The taxpayer's income is W(N)=W(1-t)+tx if no audit is conducted. If the taxpayer is audited, a 
proportion α∈[0,1] of the evaded tax tx is detected. Income is then reduced by the amount of tax evasion 
detected multiplied by the gross penalty rate Θ>1 . Thus, in the event of an audit, the taxpayer's income is 
W(A)=W(1-t)+(1-Θα)tx . We assume that audits are random and that the taxpayer knows the probability p of 
being audited, but is uncertain about α, and hence is uncertain about the effectiveness of tax audits  for 
detecting evasion. The taxpayer is assumed to be strictly risk averse, and expected utility maximizer with the 
                                                           
25 The simulation cited models inspection as they were developed randomly, therefore the effect of inefficiency seems 
larger, but at this stage we would just create a reliable scenario for our empirical findings. 
26 Di Porto (2009) finds very weak evidence of re-inspection even on the whole Italian market.  
27 Usually an employer threatened with a penalty takes legal procedures against the INPS based on possible 
procedural infractions during conduction of the audition. A slow civil justice system as in Italy, implies at least 3 year 
for a preliminary decision, and another 3 for the final decision. Therefore, at least 6 years is likely to pass before the 
fine is payable. At the end of this long procedure the employer could ask to pay in 60 installments. In Italy amnesty tax 
laws are quite frequent (one every 7-8 years) and this allows the employer to pay just a part of the fine imposed. 
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von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(W) . Thus, the taxpayer chooses x subject to the constraints  
W≥x≥0 to maximize the expected utility function:  
(1-p)U(W(N))+p∫U(W(A))dF(α) where the cumulative distribution function F(α) represents the taxpayer's 
uncertainty about α. We assume that the taxpayer's expected return per euro of tax evaded is positive. Since 
the taxpayer exhibits second-order risk aversion (Segal and Spivak 1990), and the expected return to evasion 
is positive, the taxpayer's optimal choice of undeclared income x∗ is positive. 
 We assume that x∗ is less than W, and therefore satisfies the first-order condition:  
(1-p)U′(W(N))+p∫U′(W(A))(1-Θα)dF(α)=0.  
Since the taxpayer is strictly risk averse, the second-order condition is also satisfied. We now consider the 
effect on taxpayer compliance of increased uncertainty about the proportion of tax evasion that will be 
detected if an audit is conducted (audit effectiveness). A mean preserving spread of the distribution F(α) 
(Rothschild  and  Stiglitz  (1971))  decreases  the  amount  of  tax  evasion  if  the  integrand  in  the  first-order 
condition, U′(W(A))(1-Θα) is a concave function of α, that is, if 2U′(W(A9)+(1-Θα)txU′′′(W(A))is negative. 
 The first term is negative given risk aversion (U′′<0) , and the second term is non-positive if the taxpayer is 
downside risk averse (U′′′>0) and α is no less than 1/Θ. Observe that α must exceed 1/Θ for at least some 
values  in  support  of  F(α),  otherwise  the  taxpayer  would  report  no  income,  which  is  contrary  to  our 
assumption.  We  conclude  that  prudence  (i.e.,  risk  aversion  accompanied  by  downside  risk  aversion)  is 
sufficient to imply that tax evasion decreases with greater uncertainty about audit effectiveness, provided the 
taxpayer believes that the proportion of evaded tax detected by an audit will never be less than 1/Θ . This 
result allows us to use the property α≥1/Θ in order to understand the relation between uncertainty, penalty 
and compliance. For example, in Italy θ=1.33 ,  considering a tax of recovery r=1, an employer would have 
to have an uncertainty of around 75% (i.e. , he believes that at least around the 75% of the amount evaded 
will be detected)of an inspection, for this to be a considerable tax evasion deterrent. As already underlined, 
in Italy r is considerably less than 1, to be precise, in a computation, the Corte dei Conti shows (for the first 
time in 2007) that the recovery rate for evaded contributions is around 22.3%. Taking this into consideration 
, we can fix the uncertainty rate at around 90% and using the previous property, calculate the gross penalty 
rate Θ, to obtain 5.05. This is the penalty rate that equates with the decision to evade. This means that, even 
considering a high uncertainty (credible only if the employer believes that inspectors are able to detect 90% 
of the total evasion) we should increase the penalty rate by around 5 times, to obtain a good deterrent effect 
against non compliance. 
    This theoretical result means we should not expect an audit to have a major impact on compliance. In fact, 
if we assume that employers are prudent (i.e. risk adverse and downside risk adverse) we would suggest that 
the Italian "real penalty rate" is not enough to achieve compliance. 
To summarize, we have no preliminary “rational” clues to believe that audits for labor tax evasion in the case 
of artisan sector will have a positive influence on compliance behavior. This is the null hypothesis we test. 
               
5.2 The effect of auditing on firms’ declarations 
 
    In this section, we estimate two empirical models to explain the impact of an audit on the employer's 
decision to hire workers. In particular, we want to know what is the effect of an inspection on the propensity 
to declare workers and/or  to hire and not declare workers. 
    For this reason, we calculate, first DiD fixed effect panel regressions, in which the dependent variable is 
the difference in the number of declared workers for two consecutive years and the covariates are dummy 
variables built by multiplying the amount of the fine imposed by a dummy that equals 1 if the firm was 
audited. In the second analysis, the difference in the estimated number of FTE undeclared worker (for two 
consecutive years), is regressed as a dependent in a pooled linear regression using the same covariates as 
before. As we have already mentioned, we are dealing with a unbalanced panel dataset, which creates some 
problems in choosing the right sample for our models. 11 
 
   First, we have to exclude the possibility that an inspection will lead to closure of the artisan firm's activity; 
this is the same as the attrition problem for our panel.  Artisan firms might have short lives due to the 
seasonality  of their  production. The  event  of  an inspection  could  be  non-significant in  explaining  what 
happens to the firm's activity; nevertheless, it could induce the employer to close or to modify his declared 
labor force. Our theoretical view leads us to question whether closing production after an inspection is 
unlikely. This is because Italian audits are not very powerful in terms of the fines imposed (the recovery 
system is not efficient and few audits result in high fines). Moreover, following the Snow Warren Bayesian 
game, it is possible that the event of an audit could increase the number of under declarations. 
    If we can show that an inspection cannot lead to the end of the firm's activity, we can demonstrate that the 
event is either not significant or induces a modification in the number of declared workers. 
 Therefore, finding that an audit is not significant in explaining firm mortality allows us to use just the firms 
that are always active (during the whole observation period), in order to regress the difference in the number 
of declared workers on the event of being inspected
28. 
    Table 8  presents the conditional fixed effects logistic regression, in which the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable PROB_OUT which is 1 if the firm(i) closes its activity in the year t , and 0 otherwise. 
The covariate is  ANYMONEY, which is a dummy variable equal  to 1 if the  firm(i)  was inspected and 
detected as irregular in the year t. We are interested in the relation between the dependent  in the year t and 
the covariate in the year t-1.    
    Inspections are not significant to explain firm mortality as shown in table 2, and confirm that audits seem 
not to have a great impact on firm survival, which we investigated further in the theoretical part. 
    Based on this evidence, we analyze a sample composed of firms active across the whole period. 
    We show first (table 9) a panel of fixed effects linear regression where the dependent variable is DF , i.e. 
the difference in the number of declared workers  for year t and year t-1, and the covariates are 3 dummies 
FINELOW, FINEMED  and FINEHIGH. The first is 1 if the firm is inspected in year t and receives a fine of 
less than 500 euro, the second is 1 if the firm is inspected in year t and the fine  is between 500 and 2,236 
euro, the third is 1 for fines of more than 2,237 euro (i.e. the 75th percentile of the fine distribution). 
    Table 9 also presents a pooled linear regression,  which uses the differences in the estimated number of 
black economy workers per firm for two consecutive years as the dependent variable, DFBW, this variable is 
directly computed form our DH predictions. In both models, we are interested in the relation  between the 
dependent variable at time t and the covariates at time t-1.     
    In the first case we  use a panel regression to formulate our  DiD evaluation, here  our counterfactual is 
created from the non inspected firms based on the whole observation, (therefore we take in to account for 
this first model either inspected firms or non inspected active for the whole period), We formulate the model 
including and excluding time dummies. The results for all the covariates are significant, and the number of 
declared workers decreases with the event of an audit.  As the fine increases,  the negative differential also 
becomes larger. 
    For the second model we prefer not to use the panel formulation, because in this case the coefficients may 
not be so  simple to interpret.  For the dependent variable we use  the estimated value of undeclared work , 
which, in principle, is a function of the event of being inspected. This could introduce different problems, for 
example, collinearity. We prefer  to formulate a pooled model, allowing for the possibility of having time 
dummies. 
                                                           
28 The idea is simply that an inspection could induce 3 different events in the firm's life: a) end of the firm activity; b) 
no effect; c) modification in the number of workers declared. Therefore, if we find that a) does not apply, we can take 





 Our choice is driven by the idea to complete our analysis, considering the fact that results are extremely 
interesting even if we recognize that the coefficient found could be difficult to interpret. The coefficients of 
the covariates go in a interesting direction. Our covariates are not significant therefore an inspection cannot 
be  seen  as  a  sure  deterrent  against  undeclared  work.  In  the  second  model  including  time  dummies 
coefficients, remaining not significant, go in the direction suggested by Snow Warren. These results explain 
the theory that inspections do not forcedly increase compliance, and also in relation to the second point, 
although the evidence is weaker, it is in line with the Snow Warren Bayesian game. 
 The  implications  for  policy  from  the  first  model  are  strongly  that  audits  reduce  tax  revenues  (and 




6.  Conclusions  
     
We used individual audit micro data in order to understand the behavior of an employer faced with the 
decision about whether or not to try to evade social insurance tax when there is the threat of an audit. We use 
the population of Piedmont artisan firms to explain the real impact of an audit policy on a firm‟s decision. 
 We built a new dataset to use in a double hurdle selection model to predict the number of undeclared 
workers in the market. The estimation procedure predicts the number of FTE irregular positions; the estimate 
is  unbiased  due  to  the  procedure  used,  and  reveals  an  average  of  14%  of  undeclared  workers.  To  our 
knowledge this is the first attempt of predicting labor tax evasion at this refined-level. 
    We  assessed  audit  policy  evaluations  to  understand  the  impact  of  inspection  on  firms‟  compliance 
decisions,  and  find  that:  inspections  could  induce  counterproductive  reactions.  The  number  of  declared 
workers decrease significantly with the amount of the fine imposed, reducing tax revenue. 
    Our empirical findings suggest that an employer has a lower expectation of a future audit if he or she has 
been audited in the past. As a consequence evasion and undeclared workers could be increased by an audit 
event. In both of our models, the empirical findings are in line with the theory. 
    The individual contributive audit data used in this analysis, provides an interesting and useful instrument 
to asses policy evaluation and estimations of undeclared workers. Since this is a novel dataset, we believe 
that further work could be done in terms of evasion estimations or evaluation. Nevertheless, we think that 
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    Our panel is composed by 200965 firms. In table 1 we present the number of active firms and the number 
of inspected firms per year. 
     
 
Table1: descriptive statistics on firms non audited, audited, undeclared workers detected and declared workers. 
Firms   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
not audited  127,170  128,758  130,318  131,814  132,455  134,572 
audited  1,293  1,898  2,338  2,503  2,088  1,705 
Total  128,463  130,656  132,656  134,317  134,543  136,277 
Workers                   
Undeclared 
            mean  0.17  0.20  0.19  0.15  0.12  0.08 
Sd  3.50  2.78  4.00  1.72  1.71  0.68 
Max  309  197  427  156  157  27 
Declared                    
mean   0.98  0.97  1.06  1.01  1.00  0.95 
sd   2.51  2.49  2.60  2.50  2.49  2.96 
max   45  52  58  41  56  45 
 
Source: our computation on INPS and Osservatorio artigiani Data 
 
    The number of active firms is constantly increasing in 2000-2005. During the same period, the number of 
inspected firms increases up to 2003 and then decreases from 2003 to 2005 . The percentage of inspected 
firms is around 1.5% per year. The number of inspections in the artisan sector increases rapidly after 2001 
for several reasons which it is difficult to take into consideration in our analysis. After 2001, INPS increased 
enforcement and recruited more inspectors, although we do not know how many were assigned to Piedmont. 
During  2002,  across  the  whole  of  Italy,  INPS  conducted  a  number  of  audits  aimed  at  supporting  the 
imminent approval of an amnesty tax law for nonresident workers - the Bossi/Fini law. However, we have no 
way of knowing which audits resulted from this action. Certainly, the increased number of inspections is 
related to the increase in the number of active firms (see TableA1 above. It should be remembered, that INPS 
strategies derive principally from considerations for the whole Italian labor market, of which artisan firms 
are a small  proportion.  
Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics for number of workers "declared" by employers. It is usual in Italy 
to find a large number of small firms with more than the 90% of Italian firms employing fewer than four  
(declared) workers. This is also applicable to France, Spain and some areas of Germany. Therefore, the case 
of artisan employment is a good example for the Italian environment. The average number of declared 
workers is near to 1 (this is because for this summary statistic, we set the number of declared workers to =0 
when the firm owner (employer) is the only worker declared, a situation that is common among Italian 
firms), only a few firms are larger than 40 employees, which is the generally the upper bound for a firm to be 
considered artisan. There are cases were artisan firms could have employment of more than 40 if experts are 
hired for a set period of time. As already noted, it is important to analyze the case of firms that drop out of 
the  sample completely or stop  production for a period  . Table 2 provides preliminary evidence on this 
particular problem. 




Table 2: percentage of firms inspected (and not inspected) that goes out of our sample between two years 
 
% Firms out   2000/2001  2001/2002  2002/2003  2003/2004  2004/2005 
non insp  7.22  5.99  7.75  8.65  7.25 
insp  8.03  5.39  7.63  10.39  8.23 
 
Source: our computation on INPS and Osservatorio artigiani Data 
     
    Table 2 reports the percentage of firms that discontinued activity as artisan companies
29. In the transition 
for year t and year t+ 1. We divide the sample into two groups for this analysis, to better understand the 
motivation for activity ceasing. Therefore, for every year we observe the group of firm that is inspected, and 
the  group that is  not inspected. Comparing the percentage of firms that  drop out  of these  two samples  
between year t and year  t+1, we  note that the annual difference in the two samples is always less than 1%. 
Moreover, in some transitions, the sign of this difference changes (i.e. in 2001 -2002 and 2002-2003, non 
inspected firms appear to be more likely to discontinue their activities).This is a preliminary test to show that 




Table 3: descriptive stats on evasion detected every year, numbers in euro 
Evasion   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
mean  1,147  772  479  879  1,218  1,028 
p50  0  0  0  0  0  0 
sd  16.313  7.040  4.005  13.099  10.106  10.336 
max  1,104,931  318,880  112,550  1,142,447  436,340  475,690 
 
Source: our computation on INPS and Osservatorio artigiani Data 
 
 
     Table 3 presents detected evasion result from an audit, in euro and provides some summary statistics. This 
is based on taking into consideration every firm in the sample; thus, the large number of zeros is based on the 
fact that in the majority of cases there was no inspection . We can see that for the inspected firms, the 
variable “euro evaded” is extremely skewed, the median is around 50 euro and the 75th percentile is around 
2237 euro. If we look at average values, we can see that this distribution is specular to the distribution of 
inspected firms. Therefore, we observe an increasing value of detected evasion during the years in which 
there are fewer audits. In some years when productivity per inspection increases. INPS asked to its Regional 
agencies to obtain the same level of euro detected but at the same time, they decreased the budget of every 
agency. In some parts of Italy such as Piedmont this increased the value per inspection.  
Table 4 shows the average annual amount of labor taxes that an employer has to  pay for one FTE worker. 
Comparing these values, with those in Table 3, we observe that the average value of detected evasion is 
around 1/4 of the value of the tax that has to be paid. This means that, on average, an audit discovers 1 
undeclared FTE for 2/3 months. Table 1 (the bottom) supports this providing evidence of the number of 
undeclared workers detected during an inspection. Here, the average is 0.15, which corresponds to 2 months 
full time period of black work. Note that the distribution of the maximum shows that, every year, there is at 
least one “massive” evasion case discovered. These are usually cases of “completely in black” production. 
                                                           
29 More precisely, a firm may disappear from our sample by becoming too big to be classed as an artisan as well as if it 
ceases production. In this case production passes from the manufacturing sector to the industrial sector. As there are 
very few artisan firms that develop industrial scale production in Piedmont, we do not take account of this possibility 17 
 
There are fewer of these cases these are striking but really out of the normal standard evasion that at least for 
Piedmont artisan sector seems to be diffused but minor. 
 
   
Table 4: average amount of labor taxes to be paid for a FTE worker every year on different sectors, numbers in euro 
 
Labor Tax.  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Mech.    4,807  5,107  5,387  5,496  5,835  5,806 
Light manif.  4,090  4,255  4,377  4,464  4,580  4,604 
Ot. manif.  4,467  4,679  4,861  4,977  5,349  5,210 
Constr.   4,697  5,159  5,372  5,473  5,735  5,739 
Reparation   4,447  4,738  4,906  5,035  5,310  5,246 
Transport   5,715  5,925  6,029  6,142  6,400  6,170 
Firm's serv.  3,832  4,074  4,194  4,267  4,474  4,349 
Pers. serv.  3,145  3,205  3,284  3,404  3,583  3,588 
 

































Table 5: Double Hurdle Estimation 
 
Double Hurdle Model  
   first stage probit  second stage ZTNB     first stage probit  second stage ZTNB 
 
isp  mfx  disHTE  mfx     Isp  mfx  disHTE  mfx 
  
                  Dep  0.008***  0.000***  0.018***  0.027***  uff2  0.368***  0.001*** 
   
 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.010)     (0.049)  (0.000) 
    Agefirm  -0.002***  -0.000***  -0.005  0.001***  uff3  0.395***  0.001*** 
   
 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)     (0.059)  (0.000) 
    Sex  -0.021  -0.000  -0.061  -0.007  uff4  0.409***  0.001*** 
   
 
(0.018)  (0.000)  (0.084)  (0.005)     (0.047)  (0.000) 
    light manif.  0.028  0.000  -0.176*  -0.092  control2  2.291***  0.141*** 
   
 
(0.022)  (0.000)  (0.105)  (0.131)     (0.086)  (0.018) 
    ot. manif.  -0.015  -0.000  0.109  -0.248*  control3  2.215***  0.105*** 
   
 
(0.027)  (0.000)  (0.128)  (0.140)     (0.058)  (0.008) 
    constr.   0.010  0.000  -0.038  0.171  control4  2.226***  0.120*** 
   
 
(0.018)  (0.000)  (0.086)  (0.210)     (0.058)  (0.009) 
    reparation   0.000  0.000  -0.304*  -0.057  control5  1.805***  0.059*** 
   
 
(0.026)  (0.000)  (0.164)  (0.129)     (0.119)  (0.013) 
    transport   -0.013  -0.000  -0.058  -0.398**  control6  2.154***  0.109*** 
   
 
(0.036)  (0.000)  (0.150)  (0.188)     (0.062)  (0.010) 
    firm's serv.  -0.025  -0.000  0.210  -0.084  Period 
   
0.000***  -0.130 
 
(0.036)  (0.000)  (0.154)  (0.213)    
   
(0.000)  (0.204) 
pers. serv.  -0.017  -0.000  -0.331**  0.347  task2 
   
0.587**  0.717*** 
 
(0.028)  (0.000)  (0.158)  (0.281)    
   
(0.236)  (0.236) 
Asti  -0.017  -0.000  -0.210*  -0.429**  task3 
   
0.565**  1.068* 
 
(0.026)  (0.000)  (0.117)  (0.177)    
   
(0.251)  (0.592) 
Biella  0.063**  0.000*  0.062  -0.289*  year2001 
   
-0.100  -0.144 
 
(0.032)  (0.000)  (0.145)  (0.150)    
   
(0.099)  (0.140) 
Cuneo  -0.056**  -0.000**  -0.139  0.095  year2002 
   
-0.119  -0.171 
 
(0.024)  (0.000)  (0.117)  (0.229)    
   
(0.107)  (0.148) 
Novara  -0.042  -0.000  -0.246*  -0.197  year2003 
   
-0.221**  -0.309** 
 
(0.030)  (0.000)  (0.138)  (0.157)    
   
(0.100)  (0.132) 
Torino  -0.042**  -0.000**  -0.102  -0.331**  year2004 
   
-0.155  -0.222* 
 
(0.020)  (0.000)  (0.083)  (0.168)    
   
(0.098)  (0.134) 
Verbania  -0.083*  -0.000**  -0.083  -0.151  year2005 
   
-0.087  -0.127 
 
(0.043)  (0.000)  (0.179)  (0.122)    
   
(0.106)  (0.149) 









       
   Observations  784148  784148 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
           











Table 6: estimated average number of FTE undeclared workers in the artisan sector 
undeclared work estimation 
Year  Province  Sector 
2000  0.16  Alessandria  0.14  Mech.    0.26 
2001  0.14  Asti  0.11  Light manif.  0.11 
2002  0.14  Biella  0.13  Ot. manif.  0.15 
2003  0.13  Cuneo  0.11  Constr.   0.12 
2004  0.14  Novara  0.1  Reparation   0.08 
2005  0.15  Torino  0.17  Transport   0.12 
   
Verbania  0.12  Firm's serv.  0.17 
   
Vercelli  0.12  Pers. serv.  0.09 
 









Table 7: descriptive stats on the variable FTEBW 
FTEBW 
mean  1.10 
sd  5.28 
p50  0.00 
p75  0.46 
p95  5.01 
max  235.24 
 












Table 8: probit estimation on the probability of going out of the sample 
Conditional fixed-effects                 
PROB_OUT   coeff   St. Err  Z  P-value  Conf 
anymoney(t-1)  -0.014  (0.045)  -0.31  0.755  -0.101  0.074 
Number of obs  784148 
           




Table 9: Difference in differences estimations, first using the difference in the declared number of workers as dependent, 2
nd using 
the difference in the estimated number of FTE undeclared workers 
  
Difference in Differences 
   DF declared  DF estimate BW 
Fine high  -0.495***  -0.426***  -0.001  0.001 
 
(0.030)  (0.024)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
finemed  -0.103***  -0.216***  -0.002  0.001 
 
(0.039)  (0.033)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
finelow  -0.115***  -0.196***  -0.004*  -0.003 
 














































Constant  0.013*** 
 




(0.001)  (0.002) 
          Observations  488984  488984  42926  42926 
N id  81496  81496       
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 














We develop a number of robustness and specification check for our DH model. 
The first check provided is a Likelihood-ratio test, for our first stage DH, Probit we test a restricted model 
without Uff(i) and Control(i) dummies against an unrestricted that hold the two sets of covariates the result 
is: LR chi2(8)  =  46861.54 (Assumption: restricted nested in unrestricted)  and Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 . 
The same could be seen with a battery of Wald test for Uff(i) and Control(i) covariates, which lead to 
 chi2(8) =12435.89  and Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 . We also provide a Wald test for the probit with all the 
covariates  in  obtaining  chi2(  25)  =12933.32  and    Prob  >  chi2  =    0.0000.  All  the  tests  confirm  that 
unrestricted model has to be preferred. 
For the second stage ZTNB we provide as well a battery of Wald tests, we start for a model including all the 
covariates but not Task(i) and years obtaining chi2( 17) =112.80 and Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 . Then we include 
Task(i) obtaining chi2( 19) = 118.82 and Prob > chi2= 0.0000. And we finish including also year dummies, 
chi2( 19) =  118.82 and Prob > chi2 = 0.0000.  Relying on Wald tests, even in this second stage we prefer 
this last formulation with all the covariates in. 
Another interesting point to test is the normality of the residuals in the two model of the DH. We show that 
graphically, the two graphs below (graph 1 and 2) shows the quantiles of our residual distribution on the 
quantiles of a normal distribution. Quantiles of the two distributions almost overlap this conduce to believe 
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